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THESIS

**ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL GUARD TO PROVIDE
EFFECTIVE DOMESTIC OPERATIONS**

by

Shawn Patrick Fitzgerald

December 2011

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Stanley Supinski
Jeffrey Burkett

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**ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL GUARD TO
PROVIDE EFFECTIVE DOMESTIC OPERATIONS**

Shawn Patrick Fitzgerald
Lieutenant Colonel, 106th Operations Support Commander
New York Air National Guard, New York
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1996

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2011**

Author: Shawn Patrick Fitzgerald

Approved by: Stanley Supinski, PhD
Thesis Advisor

Colonel Jeffrey Burkett
Second Reader

Daniel Moran, PhD
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Over the last 30 years, the National Guard (NG), out of necessity, has needed to look beyond each individual state's boundaries in an attempt to respond collectively better as a NG rather than individual militias. As a result of this shifting need in domestic operations, the current structure of the NG is not conducive to providing efficient and effective support for these homeland security missions.

The NG should establish regional command relationships that extend beyond current state boundaries to respond better to homeland security missions. Establishing regional command relationships will enhance the NG's homeland response better to both natural and man-made disasters. Instead of having the current model of 54 separate entities, the NG with regionalization, could utilize the current model of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s 10 regions or a model similar to that used by Canada Command and the Canadian Forces (CF). Creating a regional structure would allow a better disbursement of limited resources and provide a more efficient response to the incident site. States within the same region would essentially have a compact that would allow other state's NG assets to deploy and operate in a time of need; all controlled by a regional director or commander.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFNORTH	Air Forces North
AFRCC	Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
ANG	Air National Guard
ANGI	Air National Guard Instruction
BDE	Brigade
BN	Battalion
BSI	Base Support Installation
C2	Command and Control
C2CRE	Command and Control Contingency Response Element
CAT	Crises Action Team
CBRNE	Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear or high yield Explosives
CERFP	CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package
CF	Canadian Forces
CNGB	Chief National Guard Bureau
CRO	Combat Rescue Officer
CST	Civil Support Team
DCE	Defense Coordinating Element
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DCRF	Defense Chemical Response Force
DCU	Defense Coordinating Unit
DEF	Defense
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
DUB	Daily Update Brief
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO	Government Accountability Office

HICON	Higher Command
HRF	Homeland Response Force
HS	Homeland Security
JATF	Joint Aviation Task Force
JET	Joint Enabling Team
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JIEE	Joint Information Exchange Environment
JTF	Joint Task Force
MA	Mission Assignment
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDNG	North Dakota National Guard
NG	National Guard
NGA	National Governor's Association
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGCO	National Guard Coordinating Officer
NGDO	National Guard Domestic Operations
NGR	National Guard Regulation
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
NRF	National Response Framework
NSSE	National Special Security Event
OG	Operations Group (Air Force)
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	Public Affairs
PJ	Pararescueman
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAMZ	Rigging Alternate Method – Zodiac (Inflatable Boat rigged for airborne insertion)
RFA	Request for Federal Assistance
RJTF	Regional Joint Task Force
SAD	State Active Duty
SAR	Search and Rescue
SEC	Secretary
T/O	Task Organization
TAG	The Adjutant General
T-Duck	Tethered Duck (Inflatable Boat rigged for Helicopter Transport)

UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Recognizing the extremely important and prominent role of the National Guard (NG) in homeland security, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) has established a list of “essential 10” capabilities for NG domestic operations that include aviation/airlift, command and control, chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear or high yield explosives (CBRNE) response, engineering, medical, communications, transportation, security, logistics, and maintenance (National Guard Bureau, 2010). Although recognizing these capabilities is important, the current organization of the NG is not conducive to providing efficient and effective support for these homeland security missions.

Over the last 30 years, the NG has begun to look beyond each individual state’s boundaries in an attempt to respond better collectively as a NG rather than individual militias. One way states can augment another state in need is through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As stated in the National Response Framework (NRF): “if a State anticipates that its resources may be exceeded, the Governor can request assistance from the Federal Government and/or from other States through mutual aid and assistance agreements, such as the EMAC (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 6). Through this request, states can aid each other without having to go to the federal level, and provide and receive unique capabilities to which they may not otherwise have access. One problem is that an EMAC is not binding or authoritative. The governor, who controls the forces being requested, can deny a request, which would delay the delivery for the requesting state to receive the assets needed.

Another problem associated with the EMAC is that a state in need is often unaware of the capabilities and assets that a neighboring state can provide. Not knowing what to ask for, and that the EMAC process depends on the goodwill of each state with no oversight from a higher headquarters, can be problematic. Although the EMAC process is currently being utilized with some degree of success, it can certainly be improved.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main question this thesis attempts to answer is what organizational changes can be made within the NG to better effect domestic operations?

Secondary questions are the following.

- Would changing to a regionalized organizational structure make the NG more effective in supporting and conducting homeland security related missions?
- Are there partnerships that can be changed or expanded to increase the effectiveness of the NG in domestic operations?
- Are there lessons to be learned from another country's use of military forces for domestic operations?

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

In a time of increasing threat and responsibility with decreasing assets, it is imperative that the U.S. government operate more efficiently with less. The same is true in domestic operations with the NG. This research is significant in that it attempts to identify a shift from the current state-centric thinking of the NG force and outline a regional approach. Establishing a regional approach to domestic military operations allows the NG to respond with the appropriate asset at the right time, and thus, serving the American citizen in a better capacity. Finally, this thesis addresses the question of whether the NG should adopt a regionalized approach to domestic operations.

D. HYPOTHESES

The NG should establish regional command relationships that extend beyond current state boundaries to respond better to homeland security missions. Establishing regional command relationships will better enhance the NG's homeland response to both natural and man-made disasters. Instead of having the current model of 54 separate entities, the NG with regionalization, could utilize the current model of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s 10 regions or a model similar to that used by Canada Command and the Canadian Forces (CF). Creating a regional structure would allow for a better disbursement of limited resources and provide a more efficient response

to the incident site. States within the same region would essentially have a compact to allow other state's NG assets to deploy and operate in a time of need; all controlled by a regional director or commander.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that the Department of Defense will undergo a reorganization of forces. The focus of this reorganization is concentrated on the regionalization of Army NG units that respond to Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear or High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents. Regionalizing will enhance their lifesaving capabilities, maximize their flexibility, and reduce their response times and should be expanded to include the entire NG force.

E. METHODOLOGY

Research for this thesis is a policy options analysis. The thesis follows the seven steps of policy options analysis: defining the problem, constructing alternative solutions, selecting criteria, projecting outcomes, analyzing trade-offs, choosing the best solution and explaining the recommendation. This thesis concentrates on two solutions focused on restructuring the organizational structure of the NG. The first solution focuses on the status quo without changing the current authority of the 54 states and territories, as well as the existing EMAC currently used to aid in domestic operations. The second solution is to regionalize the current 54 entities that comprise the NG, and spread the capabilities of the different units throughout a designated region instead of just a state. Additionally, the Canadian military and the newly created Homeland Response Force, which operates regionally for domestic operations, provide a case study of how a regional model could be applied. Two functional areas are evaluated with these solutions, command and control and interagency collaboration.

The criteria of command and control evaluates the perceived effectiveness among the solutions. Is there a clear chain of command or does the solution require military forces to work for several different commands? The final criteria of interagency collaboration is evaluated by how the proposed solution incorporates other agencies and partners likely to be involved in a regional response.

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II. BACKGROUND

The NG consists of over 365,800 Army National Guard soldiers and over 107,000 airmen in the Air National Guard and plays an integral and unique role within this nation's military structure (the Navy, Marines and Coast Guard have no forces in the NG). "The NG maintains a unique "dual status"—with both state and federal roles and missions. This dual status is rooted in Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution. These constitutionally-based dual roles and missions result in each Guardsman holding memberships in both the National Guard of his or her state—for their state role and missions—and also in the National Guard of the United States—for their federal role and missions" (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 3). This dual status allows the NG to utilize many of its capabilities in support of homeland security missions without violating many of the current laws regarding the Posse Comitatus Act, which limits the use of federal military forces in support of domestic law enforcement operations.

The NG traces its history back to the earliest English colonies in North America. "The NG, the oldest component of the Armed Forces of the United States and one of the nation's longest-enduring institutions, is over 374 years old" (National Guard, 2011). Unfortunately, much of the organization and structure has not changed over the last 374 years. The historical thinking of maintaining the NG solely for domestic response within state borders contributes to the lack of change. "Strict peacetime state control over the NG is a vestige of a defensive colonial militia system, designed by the Constitution's framers to not only provide protection against foreign incursion but also assuage fear of the standing professional army" (Frantz, 2005, p. 11).

Comprised of 54 separate headquarters with each state and four territories having a force under the control of the governor, the NG is able to respond to a respective governor's call or become federalized by the President. Having 54 separate NG forces with no central reporting headquarters during a domestic incident hinders the ability to

provide a coordinated response across state lines. The governors retain operational control over their NG assets unless the units are called into federal service, which typically involves a deployment overseas.

A basic understanding of the NG is important for the reader to understand better some of the complexities involved in the NG performing domestic operations. A basic overview of the NG duty statuses, domestic mission areas as defined by the NG, and the basic framework of the NG is important to understand. Additionally, an overview of Posse Comitatus Act, the current command and control structure, and the EMAC aids the reader in understanding how these areas could potentially be improved later in the paper.

A. DUTY STATUS

The status of NG forces is an important aspect as it defines the roles, responsibilities and authorities of any given mission in which NG forces are tasked. Their status is also the key component in determining which laws apply. NG Soldiers and Airmen are only subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) when in federal status. While in a state status, they are subject to their respective state codes of military justice. Similarly, the Posse Comitatus Act only applies to NG Soldiers and Airmen when they are in a federal status but not when they are in a state status (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 10).

Two general categories drive the status in which NG Soldiers and Airmen fall, state or federal. Within the state status, two categories exist, State Active Duty and Title 32. As stated in the Constitution, the militia is under the exclusive command and control of the governor unless called into federal service or otherwise federalized. In other words, unless specifically federalized, all NG Soldiers and Airmen operate in either State Active Duty or Title 32 status. In this state status, NG units operate under the command and control of their governor or The Adjutant General (TAG), the designated Commander in Chief of the state military status (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 10), which is the basis for NG forces to report directly to their governor or TAG (Figure 1).

	State Active Duty	Title 32 Status	Title 10 Duty Status
Command and Control	State	State	Federal
Sovereign	Governor	Governor	President
Who Performs Duty	The State/Territory of ____ National Guard	The State/Territory of ____ National Guard	Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard of the United States
Where Duty Performed	IAW State Law	Homeland	Worldwide
Federal Tort Claim Act Applicability	No, IAW State Law	Yes	Yes
Posse Comitatus Act Applicability	No	No	Yes
USERRA Applicability	No, IAW State Law	Yes	Yes
SCRA Applicability	No, IAW State Law	In some cases	Yes
Discipline	State Military Code	State Military Code	Uniform Code of Military Justice
Federal Reimbursement for Personnel Costs	IAW Stafford Act or Cooperative Agreement	No, personnel costs paid by federal funds	No, personnel costs paid by federal funds
Reporting/ Reimbursement required for the use of Federal Equipment and Supplies	Yes, per Service Directives	In some cases	No
Pay	IAW State Law	Federal Pay and Allowances	Federal Pay and Allowances
Federal Retirement Points	No	Yes	Yes
Early Retirement Eligibility	Yes (per NDAA 2008)	Yes (per NDAA 2008)	N/A
Medical	IAW State Law	Federal	Federal
Disability	IAW State Law	Federal	Federal
Other Benefits	IAW State Law	Federal	Federal

Figure 1. Comparison of Duty Statuses for NG Personnel (From: National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. D-16)

In State Active Duty (SAD) status, NG personnel are completely tied to their respective state in both chain of command and funding. Within this status, the governor or TAG is free to utilize their NG to perform duties authorized by state law, “such as responding to emergencies or natural disasters, and are paid with state funds” (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 11). NG forces, under this status, are able to utilize their federally assigned aircraft, vehicles and equipment but are responsible for reimbursing the federal government any expenses incurred while in SAD status.

The second state status is Title 32. “Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution also authorizes the NG to operate under state control but in the service of the federal government to “execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel

invasions.” These provisions for state forces to operate in the service of the federal government while under state control are unique to the NG” (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 11). The unique difference in this status is the fact that funding comes from federal sources. The governor retains command and control of NG forces within this status, but does not provide the funding. Although Title 32 duty status is controlled by the individual states, this status is funded from federal sources to meet federal standards. These standards include training to perform duties as a reserve to federal forces; namely, preparing for overseas deployments (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 12). This area has increased over the years with this being the most common status of all NG forces.

As a sign of the expanding nature for NG domestic operations, the ability for NG forces to conduct operations beyond the initial stipulation of “executing laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions” while under Title 32 status was recently amended to include drug interdiction, counterdrug activities and “Homeland Defense Activities” (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 12). “Homeland Defense Activities” is defined by Chapter 9 of the Title 32 code as “those (activities) undertaken for the military protection of the territory or domestic population of the United States, or infrastructure, or other assets of the United States determined by the Secretary of Defense as being critical to national security from a threat or aggression against the United States” (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 12). This amendment allows for a wide category of mission sets in which the governor can command and control NG forces while using federal assets, which make the NG an invaluable force, equipped and trained with federal assets but operates on a daily basis under the command of the governor.

The third and final status in which NG personnel fall under is Title 10, federal duty status. When performing duties in Title 10 status, NG forces are released from all state control and become elements of the reserve component of the federal military force (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 12). Since NG personnel are released from state control under Title 10 duty status, all applicable federal military regulations and laws apply, to include UCMJ and the restrictions as outlined in the Posse Comitatus Act. The President has the authority to order NG forces to federal duty. NG personnel have historically been called to federal duty to support overseas and domestic missions.

B. NG DOMESTIC OPERATIONS MISSION AREAS

The NG was originally organized to defend individual communities and states 140 years prior to the Declaration of Independence (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 8). Although the environment has certainly changed over the last 345 years, the core function of the NG has not; it is still organized to defend individual communities and respective states. To perform their mission of domestic operations, the NG has created three distinct mission areas (Figure 2). These three areas of domestic operations are Homeland Defense, NG Civil Support, and the NG Baseline Operating Posture (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 6).



Figure 2. The National Guard Domestic Operations Concept (From: National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 62)

The Department of Defense (DoD) serves as the primary federal agency for homeland defense. As a result, the active duty military (Title 10) is typically the primary force for this mission with the support of the NG. Any NG members performing

homeland defense are typically placed into a Title 10 federal duty status (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 5). Examples of the homeland defense mission include Operation Noble Eagle, which utilizes fighter aircraft to respond to any perceived air threat.

The NG typically performs the civil support mission in a supporting role to other state or federal agencies at all governmental levels (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 5). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) defines NG civil support as, “support provided by the NG of the several states while in State Active Duty status or Title 32 duty status to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities” (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 6). The NGB does not recognize the civil support mission when NG troops are in federal status because once federalized, they are technically part of the active duty component and no longer under state control.

When the NG conducts civil support missions, they are legally able to assist in a broad scope of missions as listed in the NGR 500-1 (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 7):

- Supporting civil authorities whose capability or capacity is insufficient to meet current requirements with general purpose, specialized, or unique NG force or capabilities
- Protecting the life, property, and safety of U.S. citizens and U.S. persons
- Protecting critical U.S. infrastructure
- Providing humanitarian assistance during disaster response and domestic emergencies
- Providing support to designated law enforcement activities and operations
- Providing support to designated events, programs, and other activities

Most of these mission sets have some sort of security related posture; in other words, some level of threat or hostility is either possible or anticipated. The only mission set that differs is the fourth. Providing humanitarian assistance during disasters or emergencies has distinct characteristics and traits from the other civil support missions.

Generally, these missions focus on providing humanitarian support with no anticipated threat or hostility (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 5).

The NG baseline operating posture is essentially the day-to-day basis in which the NG operates when not conducting homeland defense or civil support missions. In this baseline posture, NG members conduct training and proficiency in their specialized areas (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 6). This baseline posture is the normal operating posture for all NG forces unless assigned a specific mission overseas or domestically.

C. BASIC FRAMEWORK

A unique aspect of the NG is that each state and territory has a vast array of different NG units and personnel. Essentially, none of the 54 NG forces is the same. The Pennsylvania NG is regarded as one of the largest forces within the NG. With over 19,000 personnel, it is significantly larger in personnel and capabilities when compared to the 1,000 personnel representing the territory of Guam (Pennsylvania National Guard, 2011). In an attempt to counter the disparity in personnel, the NGB has recently established requirements and standards for capabilities within domestic operations for each of the 54 states and territories. Since each of the 54 states and territories has a different array of NG forces, the NGB established 10 core capabilities for homeland readiness that each governor can access within the respective NG. These 10 core capabilities “ensures consistency, commonality, and interoperability when NG units and forces conduct NG Domestic Operations outside their respective state or territorial borders” and allows for each state and territory to have these basic capabilities within the respective state (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 7). These 10 capabilities as listed by NGR 500-1 are as follows.

1. Aviation/Airlift
2. Command and Control (C2)
3. CBRNE response
4. Engineering

5. Medical
6. Communications
7. Transportation
8. Security
9. Logistics
10. Maintenance

D. POSSE COMITATUS

The Posse Comitatus Act was passed in 1878 with the intent of ending the use of federal troops in policing the Confederate states (Rand, 2002, p. 243). It is a key component in the discussion due to its varying application to federal active duty military forces and NG forces. The role of the Army as proscribed by the Posse Comitatus Act states: “whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both” (Rand, 2002, p. 244). The act is just that, a statutory act, not written in the Constitution. Over the last 30 years, both Congress and the President have made significant changes in laws to meet the changing challenges in law enforcement (Trebilcock, 2000).

Although the original intent of the Posse Comitatus Act has been changed from its Civil War era origin, it is still an applicable law that has limits to the use of the military in domestic operations. One caveat within the Posse Comitatus Act is the fact that it is not applicable to the NG when the NG is acting within the authority and command of the governor (non-federalized). A Rand study of the act states: “NG forces operating under the state authority of Title 32 (i.e., under state rather than federal service) are exempt from Posse Comitatus Act restrictions” (Rand, 2002, p. 243), which is one of the reasons why active duty military primarily conduct operations overseas and not stateside.

E. CURRENT COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

As discussed in the previous chapter, the NG is unique in that the force within each state reports to the designated state's Adjutant General (TAG) who ultimately reports to that state's governor. The role of the TAG is outlined in the NG regulation 500-1 as "The TAG directs and oversees the daily activities of the state NG in order to accomplish the statutory and regulatory functions assigned" (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 2). This role is unique in that for command and control purposes, the "buck" stops at the state level. When compared to an active duty force, the chain of command would continue through higher headquarters, the Joint Chiefs, to the President. Although the NG still follows the policies and procedures as outlined by the Joint Chiefs, no direct command relationship exists.

Although the command relationship ends at the state level, an appointed Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) does exist. The CNGB and its staff, similar to the other service chief's, have no command authority over the NG. The role of the CNGB is summarized by NG regulation 500-1 as "acts as the channel of communication to The Adjutants General, but has no authority to command the NG and does not have command authority over the NG" (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 1). Essentially, a command structure within the NG of 54 separate headquarters is created; one for each of the states and territories with NG forces to allow each governor to utilize a respective state's NG forces within legal limits; just as the President does with the active duty military. Since it is the responsibility of the state to command and control its NG forces under a state status, the state typically creates a Joint Task Force during a state domestic operation. The Joint Task Force is responsible for providing command and control for all state military assets deployed in support of a domestic operation (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 7).

One of the complexities in command and control occurred during Hurricane Katrina when both active duty forces under Title 10 and state forces under Title 32 were deployed to the Gulf Coast. As military forces were deployed in both a federal and state

status, two separate chains of command had to be established, which ultimately hurt both the unity of command and the unity of effort because the active and NG Soldiers were receiving different orders, often conflicting with the other, due to having separate chains of command. In response to this complexity, the National Governor's Association is unified in its belief that a dual status NG commander should be appointed. The dual status NG commander would command forces in both Title 10 and Title 32 status who are engaged in domestic operations within a state or territory (Figure 3). The governors believe the dual status commander should be appointed by the respective governor and the President pursuant to 32 USC Section 325 (Position HHS-03, 2007). Dual status allows the appointed commander to command both the state status NG forces, as well as the military forces in a federal status; essentially reporting to both the governor and the President (Figure 3).




Figure 3. A Dual Status Commander (From: National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 95)

Dual status has proven the most effective way for the governor to retain control of his state forces and provide unity of command with federal forces. The alternatives to dual status are the parallel command (problematic during Hurricane Katrina) or federalizing the NG. The parallel command does not allow for unity of command since two forces exist with two distinct headquarters (federal and state). Federalizing essentially takes the largest asset at the governors disposal at a time when it is arguably needed the most, thus reducing the effectiveness of the states' response. Additionally this process can be very time consuming and costly.

F. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT (EMAC)

One way states can augment another state in need is through the EMAC. As stated in the NRF: "if a State anticipates that its resources may be exceeded, the Governor can request assistance from the Federal Government and/or from other States through mutual aid and assistance agreements such as the EMAC (Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 6). Through this request, states can aid each other without having to go to the federal level and provide and receive unique capabilities to which they may not otherwise have access. The EMAC system is able to tap into both NG and civilian organizations. Typically, the requesting state emergency management office initiates the request, ideally with the knowledge of the state's NG leadership. This request is typically made to fill a need and is filled by an organization capable of fulfilling that need with personnel and equipment. For example, a request may be made for confined space rescue. The sending state would then send the confined space equipment along with qualified personnel to fulfill the need.

When NG forces respond to an EMAC, the governor is the Commander in Chief of all NG units within the state's jurisdiction not in active federal service (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 76). The EMAC is nothing more than an interstate compact signed by all 50 states and the territories that have NG forces. By entering the compact, each of the states has contractually agreed to the terms and conditions of the compact (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 77). The EMAC is the largest interstate mutual aid compact and was developed in response to the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992.

The EMAC allows states to rely on each other in responding to emergencies and reducing any capability gap between differing states' NG forces. The EMAC establishes the procedure for requesting assistance, and lists the responsibilities of both the requesting states and the assisting states (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 77). Of note, the EMAC does not require states to provide assistance when requested. The EMAC explains that assisting states have the option to withhold resources to the extent necessary to provide reasonable protection for a respective state (National Guard Bureau, 2010, p. 78). During this process, the NGB helps facilitate assistance but does not have the authority to move assets from one state to another nor direct that a particular EMAC request be executed.

The NG has the capability, manpower and legal backing to be utilized for U.S. domestic operations. Due to the increased complexity of recent man-made and natural disasters, it is imperative that the NG review its process to deploy its forces effectively and efficiently for domestic operations. The next chapter highlights the current process of utilizing NG forces and presents an alternative that may aid in effectively employing the NG for domestic operations.

III. THE NG IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Military response to domestic operations within the United States is complicated by the myriad of statutes and laws that govern U.S. military operations, which often hampers the response time and effort. The large structure of the U.S. military with four branches; the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines, along with Reserve and NG, equates to a large pool of resources and capability available to aid in domestic operations. Although the use of active military forces within domestic operations is not specifically forbidden within the Constitution, the current role of this nation's active duty military force is unlikely to change. Laws, such as Posse Comitatus, which limit the active duty's military response domestically, have been entrenched in this military and nation's culture. Additionally, U.S. active forces are continuously deploying overseas to combat this nation's threats abroad. As a result of these restrictions to the active duty force, and the fact that the NG is already a state level asset; the NG is the ideal force to respond to domestic operations.

A. ADVANTAGES OF THE CURRENT STRUCTURE

Although several issues have existed with the current structure of the NG, several reasons why this is the most capable military force for domestic operations still exist. The NG is best suited for a homeland defense and security role over its active duty counterparts. It has deep roots in its local communities. Additionally, most state adjutants general also serve as both emergency manager and homeland security director; they are engaged in intergovernmental issues, as well as federal and interagency matters.

The current structure of the NG has proven effective when responding to basic domestic operations within the respective state of the NG force, which has been evidenced by thousands of state initiated missions that involve NG forces within that state. Recently, for example, the North Dakota NG has proven to be a significant force in dealing with the monumental floods that have plagued the area. After only two weeks in May, North Dakota NG members had contributed 18,479 workdays fighting the 2011 floods (Schilinger, 2011).

The Missouri NG played a key role in aiding with the record flooding that hit Missouri in Spring 2011. Missouri's ability to not only deploy NG troops to the scene, but also combine the capabilities of both the Army and Air NG forces proved to be a tremendous benefit for the citizens of Missouri. Missouri utilized Air Guard sensors to provide photographs and streaming video, which proved to be invaluable information for responders on the ground. "Airborne sensors might spot a motorist or livestock stranded in flood waters or alert troops to a flooded road that was passable just hours earlier" (Lane, 2011).

As recent history has proven, the NG has increasingly been utilized for domestic operations outside of its assigned state. Hurricane Katrina and the hurricanes that have hit the United States since are prime examples of NG assets aiding other states. At times, the NG has struggled with this new expectation of deploying within the United States to aid other states; however, several measures have been established to better facilitate this movement.

In an attempt to address the problem of command and control, the NG created Joint Enabling Teams (JET). These joint enabling teams were created to aid in the critical link between the NGB, the supporting state and the supported state. Their defined purpose is "to provide critical NGB Joint Staff, Army and Air NG expertise to support the state during a crisis event. In essence, when a disaster strikes—NGB will be there with expertise to assist with reporting and coordination of NGB support" (National Guard Public Affairs, 2008).

These teams have proven to be a valued concept. Depending on what the state requests, the JET can deploy to provide a tiered response of support. An after action report from the NG 2008 Hurricane Season described the positive value of the JET stating that: "the concept and implementation of JETs continues to gain perceived value and credibility for both NGB Staff and the States" (National Guard Bureau J7, 2008, pp. 8–9).

Another new change that the NG is currently in the process of implementing is that of the Homeland Response Force (HRF). First mentioned in the 2010 Quadrennial

Defense Report (QDR), the HRF is designed as a regional CBRNE force that consists of NG forces. This new concept is yet to be tested and will be fully implemented in 2014 and is discussed in a later chapter.

B. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STRUCTURE

The NGB has learned from many of the past issues within domestic operations. The creation of the NG JET teams and the current implementation of the HRF are examples of addressing past issues. Despite this progress, more work is needed.

The biggest problem with the current structure of the NG to respond to a domestic operations incident is the inability to coordinate NG units quickly and efficiently to aid in multi-state events. The current structure consists of 54 separate NG headquarters, each with no higher tasking authority when their personnel are in a state status. This problem is further complicated by the structure and the way NG units are dispersed throughout the United States. Each state has different NG units, all with different specialties. For example, only the states of California, Alaska and New York have specifically dedicated search and rescue units.

This situation is problematic because states in need have 53 other NG headquarters to contact and negotiate a request for assistance. They likely do not have a thorough understanding of the NG units within the other 53 NG headquarters. The NGB is tasked to facilitate this process; however, it can only assist and has no authority in settling requests for aid.

As stated in NGR 500-1, the NGB is tasked with: “assisting in facilitating and coordinating the use of NG personnel and resources operating under Title 32 status or in support of state missions with other federal agencies, the TAGs of the several states, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and with the Combatant Commands with geographic responsibility for the United States” (National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 2008, p. 3). Absent the fact that the NGB has no position of authority to direct forces from one state to another, the fact that it facilitates and coordinates with 54 separate headquarters is a large task.

1. Span of Control

Span of control applied generally to the NGB shows the difficulty in coordinating 54 separate headquarters during a complex multi-state incident, which points to why inefficiencies certainly exist within the system. One example occurred recently with the 106th Rescue Wing during the initial planning for Hurricane Earl in August 2010. The Air NG (ANG) Crisis Action Team (CAT) located at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland determines the available Air Guard assets and facilitates coordination between the 54 NG headquarters. During Hurricane Earl in August 2010, the ANG CAT began sending messages to all state headquarters on Monday, August 30 five days prior to the hurricane hitting the eastern seaboard. The messages were sent to each state's EOC and then disseminated to each of the Air Guard Wings (Figure 4). Each Air Guard Wing then responded back to its respective EOC and the state EOC, with its current availability to respond. The messages and data received by the CAT were then used to create the CAT's Daily Update Brief (DUB). A similar method was utilized to collect information for the Army NG units; however, both processes are rife with communication problems.




Figure 4. JIEE Messaging Process

The DUB, as discerned by its name, is a daily PowerPoint brief that addresses the current crises and lists the assets available to respond to the crisis. The primary purpose of the DUB is to disseminate the most current information throughout the CAT and the Air Guard so that all key personnel are operating with a common picture. The DUB is the primary resource for each state to see what assets are available to support a disaster. The rescue/special tactics slide from the DUB dated September 3 in response to Hurricane Earl shows the rescue assets available (Figure 5). The slide shows that New York has one C-130 Fixed Wing Cargo Rescue aircraft, as well as two HH-60 Rotary Wing aircraft available to support. Had Hurricane Earl devastated the North Carolina coast, this DUB would be the primary source for the North Carolina EOC to see what Air Guard Rescue assets are available to respond.




Figure 5. Rescue/Special Tactics Slide (From: Air National Guard Crisis Action Team Daily Update Brief, 2010).

Unfortunately, this current way of operating is not effective and often leads to misinformation. One of the largest issues with the current operation utilizing the current

messaging system is the multiple levels of bureaucracy in which the necessary information needs to be sent to make the end product of the DUB. Additionally, being responsibility for collecting and disseminating the data for 54 separate headquarters is extremely challenging. This large number of headquarters and the subsequent data is well beyond the span of control for the CAT, which likely results in the loss of key information.

On August 30, 2010, when the message was sent from the ANG CAT to the New York EOC and disseminated to the 106th Rescue Wing; the wing command post requested the availability of rescue assets from the Operations Group. The rescue group commander contacted his three rescue squadrons to obtain the availability. The two flying squadrons responded with the availability of 1x C-130 and 2x HH-60 helicopters. The third rescue squadron sent the following back to the group commander:

*Personnel: 6x Combat Rescue Officers (CRO)
7x Pararescuemen (PJ)*

Internal Equipment Available:

5x Inflatable boats

Parachutes for multiple crews

Confined Space and Cutting Equipment

Medical Assets to cover two separate Mass Casualty Incident sites

Recommended Manning:

1x CRO and 2x Pararescuemen assigned to the C-130 along with parachute capability (freefall and static line), medical equipment and two RAMZ (inflatable boat with engine capable of being para-dropped into water to affect a rescue)

2x CRO and 2x Pararescuemen assigned to the HH-60s along with a T-Duck (inflatable boat with engine packaged to be deployed by rope from the helicopter), collapsed structure, medical and cutting equipment

3x CRO and 3x Pararescuemen assigned to ground alert utilizing heavy trucks and trailers towing three specialized boats for shallow water rescue, medical equipment and confined space/cutting equipment

The group commander forwarded the group information to the wing commander, who forwarded it to the state EOC. The state EOC responded to the request from the ANG CAT and forwarded the information. The ANG CAT watch officer took the

information given and created the DUB slides. Unfortunately, the only information that made the DUB for all states to see was that for rescue assets, the entire Air NG only has 1xC-130 and 2x HH-60 helicopters (Figure 3). No mention is made of the combat rescue officers and pararescuemen with medical equipment or the boats that can respond if called upon. The availability of these boat teams is critical information. During Hurricane Katrina, this squadron responded with essentially the same number of people and equipment and was credited with saving 283 lives, most using boat teams.

This exact issue was identified in the NGB Hurricane Response After Action Review in 2008. The discussion stated that a lack of understanding of how to correctly utilize the system existed and the fact that JIEE is a completely separate system from EMAC, which proved to be problematic because assets listed in one or both systems may have been double booked or requested (National Guard Bureau J7, 2008, p. 22). The recommended fix to this problem is to attempt to link the JIEE system with the existing EMAC system and have the states become better trained in its utilization.

2. Need for Inter-State Aid

Using the positive example of the Missouri NG units earlier in this chapter highlights the effectiveness of NG units responding to an in-state incident. Not all states have the capabilities that the Missouri NG brought to bear on the recent flooding. “The 157th Air Operations Group is the single largest intelligence entity within the Missouri NG. They give us the capability to request and manage the aerial collection of information that we could not collect on our own because of staffing and equipment” (Lane, 2011). The key for future successful NG responses to domestic operations is to ensure that assets needed from other states are effectively provided to the state in need, especially areas of expertise. The NG has since progressed past the days of only providing “sand bag” fillers. Its expertise in intelligence, command and control, and search and rescue should be capitalized upon, especially in states that do not have these NG units.

The EMAC was created to aid in this endeavor, but as with any tool, it has limits to its effectiveness. One problem, especially with the NG, is the coordination between the EMAC and the NGB. As described in a GAO report discussing the response to Hurricane Katrina:

Although both the EMAC network and NGB facilitate the sharing of resources across state lines, they had limited visibility into each others' systems for initiating and fulfilling requests. For example, emergency management officials responsible for coordinating requests for assistance under EMAC in the first three weeks after Hurricane Katrina made landfall stated that they were frequently unaware of NG deployments under EMAC until after the resources had already returned to their home states. In addition, NGB officials responsible for coordinating deployments of NG resources stated that they were unaware of requests for assistance made through EMAC. (Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 19)

In an effort to help, the NGB would coordinate unit deployments to the incident site to fill a known need, even if that need had not been formally requested. This lack of communication and coordination defeats the general purpose of both systems and ultimately causes redundancy and the loss of capability, which could partly be blamed on the efforts of the NGB to facilitate the flow of units outside the EMAC process.

The problems with EMAC were again highlighted after Hurricane Katrina during the 2008 hurricane season. A finding in the 2008 Hurricane Response After Action stated that several underlying issues exist with the understanding of EMAC amongst both the states and NGB (National Guard Bureau J7, 2008, p. 8). It noted that these problems have continued to persist since Hurricane Katrina. The recommendation was to increase the training on the EMAC process across all levels, both state and NGB (National Guard Bureau J7, 2008, pp. 9–10).

One unfortunate consequence of an overwhelming response in aid from other states is the fact that this “army” of aid must be given guidance to remain effective. Using Hurricane Katrina as an example, just from the NG perspective, both Louisiana and Mississippi received more out of state Guardsmen than they had within their own state by day five (Figure 6). These states were already struggling with the command and control

of their internal forces and were not prepared to receive up to four times the number of their internal state forces. These figures do not include the thousands of civilian first responders seeking guidance on where to operate. “The state of preparedness in the requesting states also had significant impact on the integration and use of EMAC teams” (Waugh, 2007, p. 111). In a GAO report in 2007, a South Carolina NG unit deployed under EMAC stated that it had “wasted valuable time” waiting for mission assignments from the Louisiana Joint Task Force from local authorities following Hurricane Katrina (Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 19).

Date	Number Serving in Louisiana			Number Serving in Mississippi		
	Louisiana National Guard Personnel	National Guard Personnel from Other States	Total	Mississippi National Guard Personnel	National Guard Personnel from Other States	Total
August 30	5,804	178	5,982	3,822	16	3,838
August 31	5,804	663	6,467	3,822	1149	4,971
September 1	5,804	2,555	8,359	3,823	2,861	6,684
September 2	6,779	5,445	12,224	3,823	3,719	7,542
September 3	6,779	10,635	17,432	3,823	6,314	10,137
September 4	6,779	12,404	19,183	4,017	9,399	13,416
September 5	6,779	16,162	22,941	4,017	10,999	15,016
September 6	6,779	20,510	27,289	4,023	11,095	15,118
September 7	6,779	22,589	29,368	4,023	11,388	15,411
September 8	6,779	23,476	30,255	4,023	11,506	15,529

Figure 6. NG Personnel Deployed in Support of Hurricane Katrina (From: Bowman, 2005, p. 11)

Another problem with the EMAC is that a state in need is often unaware of the capabilities and assets that a neighboring state can provide. Many civilian agencies do not understand the technical differences in military equipment. One example is the requesting of rescue helicopters. Unaware that most military helicopters are not equipped with a rescue hoist could cause confusion on the part of a requesting state hoping to have

helicopters rescue individuals in flooded areas utilizing hoists (something done hundreds of times by military rescue units and the Coast Guard during Hurricane Katrina and most recently in upstate New York after Hurricane Irene in 2011). A GAO report highlighted this problem regarding Hurricane Katrina in which emergency managers deployed under EMAC to Louisiana received repeated requests simply for “search and rescue” teams.

These initial requests did not contain sufficient detail regarding the type of skills and equipment needed to conduct the particular operation needed. Search and rescue missions can vary significantly to include the need for an aerial team, a canine team or a confined space team. Therefore, identifying and then clearly communicating the specific skills and equipment required is critical. “Requests that initially omitted critical mission details had to be clarified, causing delays in resource deployments of up to three or more days as requesting and assisting state officials went back and forth to clarify these details” (Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 21).

Unfortunately, the issue of clearly communicating needs was addressed again during the hurricane season of 2008. A finding in preparation for the 2009 Hurricane season stated that during the 2008 hurricane response, the NG provided nearly 60% of the SAR assets for hurricanes Ike and Gustav; therefore it will be “imperative that coordination and integration of the SAR assets be thoroughly and carefully considered” (National Guard Bureau J7, 2009, p. 5). The recommendation as a result of this finding stated, “a thorough briefing of State integrated SAR plans, roles, responsibilities and expectation of Search Action Plans should be coordinated with the Joint Integrated Air Control Team to FEMA’s Emergency Support Function (ESF) 9 [Search and Rescue Annex] primary and supporting agencies” (National Guard Bureau J7, 2009, p. 5).

Equally troubling is the fact that many of the states that provided assistance were not fully aware of the assets they had to aid in the response. Put simply, states did not know what they had to help with, which wasted precious time to figure out how they could help. Better information on internal capabilities and resources would help states better respond to disasters in their own states, as well as provide assistance elsewhere (Waugh, 2007, p. 111). Recent pre-event planning for potential disasters has shown this lack of awareness of assets and capabilities is still an issue, especially with the NG.

3. Command and Control

Recent natural disasters have exposed weaknesses in the U.S. government's response to include that of the military. The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina stated, "there is no question that the Nation's current incident management plans and procedures fell short of what was needed and that improved operational plans could have better mitigated the Hurricane's tragic effects" (Townsend, 2006, p. 19). One of the main issues exposed from the military's domestic response was unity of command.

The Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned stated, "In the overall response to Hurricane Katrina, separate command structures for active duty military and the NG hindered their unity of effort. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) commanded active duty forces, while each state government commanded its NG forces. For the first two days of Katrina response operations, USNORTHCOM did not have situational awareness of what forces the NG had on the ground. Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) simply could not operate at full efficiency when it lacked visibility of over half the military forces in the disaster area" (Townsend, 2006, ch. 5).

Although not exercised much, the dual status command seems to be the answer to bridging the gap in command and control between deployed military forces in federal status and military forces in state status. Outlining some of the advantages, Burkett states the dual status command, "promotes the control of information, timely decision making, synchronization, interoperability, and situational awareness for both state and Federal forces. This option also complies with the congressional intent of United States Code 32, Section 325 and Joint Publication 1 with respect to establishing unity of effort" (Burkett, 2008, p. 134).

Another key advantage, especially when dealing with multi-state incidents is the fact that the dual-status command has the ability to operate in a regional capacity and is not limited to state borders, which is possible, because under the dual hat, the commander will have Title 10 forces available not limited to state boundaries. Using Hurricane Katrina as an example, the dual status commander would have been able to control both the NG forces within the state, but also the Title 10 forces in a regional focus to offset

any lack of forces in any particular state. “The operational flexibility to direct Federal forces to wherever they are most needed regionally would reduce current interstate gaps and improve the application of military capability” (Burkett, 2008, p. 134).

Although the NG has successfully responded to numerous domestic operations in recent years, several lessons have been learned. One central lesson continues to evolve on the need to address operations across state lines. Recognizing this problem, the NG has created the NG JET teams and is currently creating the Homeland Response Force as mentioned previously. While these teams are certainly solutions that will help in the future, the JET teams do not address the overall problem of responding regionally, and although the HRF is regionally focused, it represents only a small fraction of the NG. A need still exists to address the problem of responding to interstate operations.

This regional shift in thinking is not a new concept. Canadian military forces have a long-standing role within domestic operations within Canada. Additionally, the NG has begun to implement a small percentage of its force with a focus on regionalization with the HRF. This shift in focus is primarily to address the past issues of disasters that have extended beyond one state.

IV. CASE STUDY—CANADIAN FORCES AND THE U.S. HOMELAND RESPONSE FORCE

A. CANADA AS AN EXAMPLE

1. Background

A look at Canada's military structure reveals a simpler, but still effective approach when compared to the United States for its military to respond to domestic operations. Canada has no equivalent to the U.S. NG, and relies solely on its active military for both international and domestic operations. Canada's reserve is similar to the U.S. military reserve in that it is a federal reserve without affiliation to a particular state or territory. Additionally, Canada does not have an equivalent to the Posse Comitatus Act, which makes the use of the military in domestic operations relatively simple. "Recent Canadian legislation, by contrast, is simple, straightforward, and flexible while at the same time incorporating important safeguards for the civil population" (Maloney, 1997, p. 138).

Canada's role of the military has been different of that of the U.S. active military as it is heavily involved in domestic operations. Over the last decade, the Canadian military has been called upon to assist civil authorities in dealing with a number of natural disasters, including floods in Manitoba and Quebec, the ice storm in eastern Canada, and security for the Olympics (Canada National Defense, 2008, p. 6). Essentially, the Canadian Forces (CF) perform the traditional missions of both the U.S. active military and the U.S. NG, and they perform both well. A focus on the involvement of the CF within Canadian domestic operations arguably draws close parallels with the U.S. NG.

A look at the CF's six core missions shows how involved the Canadian military is within Canadian domestic operations. The six core missions are as follows.

- Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD
- Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics
- Respond to a major terrorist attack
- Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada, such as a natural disaster
- Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period
- Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods (Canada National Defense, 2008, p. 3).

The first four core missions involve CF operating within Canada for domestic operations, thus drawing strong comparisons to the U.S. NG. CF play a large role in domestic operations due to the legal framework that establishes the clear role of Canada's military in the Canadian homeland. "Canada brought the exercise of emergency powers under constitutional control, while the U.S. left the regulation of emergencies to piecemeal statutory reform without regularizing its constitutional status" (Scheppele, 2006, p. 19). Canada has recognized the importance of having its military involved in domestic operations and has created the legal justifications within its constitution to support this role. This difference could be blamed on the fear of U.S. forefathers of a standing army involved in domestic operations. Canada has recognized the potential its active military can play in aiding in this new age of natural and man-made disasters; luckily, the United States has the NG; but the U.S. NG can learn strong lessons from its Canadian counterparts.

Although the U.S. NG seems to be well suited for domestic operations, the issue of having 54 separate headquarters is problematic and an issue with which the Canadian military forces do not have to contend. Canada's military organization for domestic operations is structured under what is called Canada Command. The command's headquarters is located in Ottawa with six Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTFs), three search and rescue regions, and the combined force air component commander. These organizations are delegated authority to task available Canadian Forces resources within

their areas of responsibility in support of domestic or continental operations (Canada Forces Canada Command, 2011) to allow CF to respond to domestic events quickly and efficiently (Figure 7).



Figure 7. The Canadian Military's Six Regional Joint Task Forces (From: Canada Forces Canada Command, 2011)

2. Canada's Regional Forces

Canada has recognized the need for greater coordination with government departments and agencies, as well as cross-border coordination with the United States. Canada Command helps to address the new security environment, and to facilitate coordination with law enforcement agencies and civil authorities by placing them all under the responsibility of a single operational commander (Canada Forces Canada Command, 2011).

A structured regional command system without legal pitfalls allows the Canadian military to conduct domestic operations effectively. Working with other Canadian search and rescue partners, the CF play a vital role in a world-class search and rescue system that answers the call of those in need. “Today, the Canadian Forces annually responds to approximately 8000 incidents, tasking military aircraft or ships in about 1100 cases. Historically, these actions have saved on average over 1,200 lives and provided assistance to over 20,000 persons each year” (Canadian Forces SAR, 2011). California’s Air NG Rescue Wing, one of three specialized rescue units in the NG that records saves at the unit level, recently recorded its 600th save (Teeter, 2009). The lives saved by the California rescue unit have been recorded over the last 40 years and includes lives saved overseas. This average of 15 lives saved per year is high in comparison to other U.S. NG units but is well below the 1,200 lives saved by CF each year.

It could be argued that the U.S. military has a similar SAR structure as Canada. Air Force North (AFNORTH) is responsible for the inland SAR in the United States; however, the major difference is that the AFNORTH ties directly into local, state and federal agencies. It communicates with these non-military agencies through the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) and resolves 69% of these events without committing federal assets (Conley, 2009, p. 14). Unlike the Canadian example, AFNORTH cannot utilize NG troops without federalizing them under Title 10. To accomplish the 31% of rescues that cannot be resolved at the state level or lower, AFNORTH must rely on federal assets; thus, requiring NG federalization or an active duty response. An act that is arguably much more difficult than having a regional asset ready to respond, similar to Canada.

3. Examples of Effectiveness

Another example of the CF’s ability to provide assets swiftly is Operation Recuperation. In January and February 1998, the CF participated in its largest domestic operation to date during the recovery after a severe ice storm and resultant power failure in eastern Ontario and western Quebec. Montreal and many other communities from Ontario to the coast sustained massive power loss with over a million households without

electricity. The operation highlighted the ability of CF to respond efficiently to a large emergency, with almost 16,000 personnel from all over the country participating (Hawkins, 2010).

The development of CF within domestic operations allowed for the seamless integration of the Canadian military into the security apparatus for the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. The number of forces utilized for security of the Vancouver 2010 Winter Games made this one of the largest domestic security operations in Canadian history (Mindak, 2010). Over 4,500 CF were involved in the security of this world premier event with no major issues (Canada Press, 2011).

4. Conclusion

The Canadian force structure for domestic operations is certainly one from which the U.S. can learn. The simplistic force structure of the Canadian military and the fact that its constitution allows the military to operate domestically makes Canadian domestic military operations easy to command without the legal minefield that their U.S. counterparts must negotiate. What then can the United States learn from its northern neighbor?

CF have a regionalized headquarters able to oversee and direct their forces within a domestic operation, an area in which the NG could potentially fill. The concept of regionalization is an area in which the U.S. NG is lacking as a whole; however, steps are currently being taking with the creation of 10 Homeland Response Forces (HRF) in the NG. These HRFs, with their regional structure and response, are a microcosm of the CF's and may be an example for the future structuring of the NG.

B. THE U.S. HOMELAND RESPONSE FORCE (HRF)

1. Background

Residing within each FEMA region, the HRF will serve as the command and control (C2) headquarters for Civil Support Teams (CST), CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP), and conventional military units providing support through

EMAC to a regional CBRNE incident or disaster. As part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directive, the NG must transform 10 existing “brigade” sized units into the HRFs by the year 2014 (Van Alstyne, 2011, p. 12). The key to this concept is its regional focus both in the composition of its forces and the regional area in which it will cover.

The HRF is a departure from the normal state-centric command and control that has prevailed within the NG throughout its history. NG forces within each FEMA region will collectively comprise the HRF, and pool expertise in areas, such as command and control, search and rescue, security, CBRNE, and medical treatment across the FEMA region. Figure 8 depicts the structure and concept of a Georgia-based HRF and the existing CSTs and CERFPs within FEMA Region IV.




Figure 8. FEMA Region IV HRF (From: Van Alstyne, 2011, p. 12)

The HRF concept was created to address a regional response gap despite a decade of evolving CBRNE capabilities that addressed state and large federal disasters. Disasters that occurred across entire FEMA regions, such as the Columbia space shuttle disaster and Hurricane Katrina, demonstrated the need for a regional CBRNE and disaster

response capability (Van Alstyne, 2011, p. 11). These disasters required advanced communications and interagency coordination and employed up to 22 of the state-level CSTs (Van Alstyne, 11).

In 2009, the HRF was selected from several NG and active military to fill a regional CBRNE capability between state and federal level responses (Figure 9). “As part of a comprehensive CBRNE capability known within DoD as the ‘CBRN enterprise’, the NG will maintain an existing force structure of 57 Weapon of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs or CSTs) and 17 CBRNE Enhanced Response for Packages (CERFPs) in addition to the 10 new HRFs filled by 10,000 soldiers and airmen” (Van Alstyne, 2011, p. 11).




Figure 9. Composition of the CBRN Enterprise (From: Van Alstyne, 2011, p. 29)

A simplistic view of the CBRN enterprise, using Figure 9, could be explained as the CST is a local response, and the CERFP responds to incidents within its state and the HRF is designed to bridge the gap for a regional response within each FEMA region. The DCRF mainly consists of federal forces and would respond to a national incident on the

President's orders. Depending on the severity of the national incident, the C2CRE would be activated to command and control any additional federal forces ordered to the incident area.

2. Regional Focus

The regional focus of the HRF will require them to respond across state lines, as well as cooperate and coordinate with the state and NG entities within the boundaries of the 10 FEMA regions, which also requires the NG and state agency partners to provide committed “pre-incident” support and cooperation to the HRF's regional planning, training, and exercise efforts (Van Alstyne, 2011, p. 61). The regional collaboration and sharing of resources to make the HRF successful will be unprecedented but essential to an integrated civil-military response required by large disasters. The present regional sharing of the NG through EMAC must now extend “pre-incident” to the new HRF to ensure regional level response success. “Such collaboration will ensure the HRFs maintain both the “proximity” and utility to response efforts that other NG CBRNE elements have demonstrated” (Van Alstyne, 2011, p. 62). External to their FEMA regions, the HRFs will have to collaborate with NORTHCOM and federal military forces responding to natural disasters or as part of DoD's CBRN enterprise (Figure 10).




Figure 10. HRF Collaboration & Response Spectrum (From: Van Alstyne, 2011, p. 62)

The regional response of the HRF, and subsequently the NG forces assigned, is a unique departure from the centuries old view of NG forces being state-centric. Representing only a small percentage of the total NG, the HRF can be used as the model and example for future NG force development and deployment. Capitalizing on the collaboration and communication that must occur for the HRF to be a relevant regional force, the NG can learn from this construct and apply it beyond the CBRN enterprise.

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V. REGIONALIZING FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

The proposed solution to aid the NG to respond efficiently to multi-state incidents is the establishment of a regional command relationship. Establishing regional command relationships will better enhance the NG's homeland response to both natural and man-made disasters by making the structure more manageable and efficient. Instead of having the current model of 54 separate state and territory headquarters individually controlling their respective assets; the NG with regionalization, should utilize the current model of FEMA's 10 regions to reduce the number of disparate commands and allow for a more efficient domestic response. From the perspective of the NGB, which is currently charged with facilitating the flow of NG troops to respond to domestic incidents; facilitating 10 regions is much more manageable than the current setup of 54 different states and territories.

A. WHY REGIONALIZE?

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) states that the DoD will undergo a reorganization of forces. The focus of this reorganization is concentrated on the regionalization of Army NG units that respond to CBRNE events (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). Regionalizing will enhance their lifesaving capabilities, maximize their flexibility, and reduce their response times and should be expanded to include the entire NG force, both Army and Air. Regionalizing the NG will allow for the use of assets already aiding in homeland security and better facilitate the use of assets across the region. Planning will be enhanced because the NG, FEMA, and the states within their respective regions will already have an established structure combining civil and military agencies at the state and federal level.

A study by the Homeland Security Policy Institute discussed the significant problems in dealing with large-scale natural or man-made disasters impacting multiple jurisdictions (Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2006, p. 7). The study was commissioned to identify the merits of making the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a more regionalized organization. The study states that, "The establishment of a

Joint Field Office in each affected state in accordance with the National Response Plan certainly helped matters as the Katrina disaster unfolded, but the spate of post-Katrina reports—including the White House after-action report, the House Select Bipartisan Committee report, and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee report—all point toward the advisability of establishing a permanent regional architecture to help coordinate federal, state, and local preparedness and response functions, and to ensure that each region is prepared to respond effectively to a catastrophic disaster” (Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2006, p. 7). While the focus of this study was on the need to regionalize the DHS, this need can be applied towards the NG and the overall efforts to increase the efficiency of the military to provide domestic response.

The idea of pairing DoD assets within the FEMA regions is not a new one. Currently, the DoD has established support at the FEMA regional offices. A Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is a military member who represents the military within each FEMA region and is supported by a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). These positions are supported by Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) at the regional and state levels who work with FEMA and the emergency management structures to support and coordinate DoD requests for assistance. Typically, the EPLOs are reserve officers on-call for emergencies (Stevenson, 2008, p. 72). This current structure falls within the umbrella of USNORTHCOM, not the NG.

This current structure of DoD and FEMA assets working together is beneficial, but the major flaw with this current structure is that it excludes the NG; the one organization that has the preponderance of forces at the state level with the legal backing to use forces unhindered by the Posse Comitatus Act. Rather than focusing NG assets at the regional level, Title 10 active duty forces are represented, almost dismissing the logical progression of utilizing the NG forces at the regional level, which could be because of the historical thinking of maintaining the NG solely for domestic response within individual states. “Strict peacetime state control over the NG is a vestige of a

defensive colonial militia system, designed by the Constitution's framers to not only provide protection against foreign incursion but also assuage fear of the standing professional army" (Frantz, 2005, p. 11).

The flaw with using USNORTHCOM is that it is a command with no abundance of forces that it can task. USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces to employ. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the President or Secretary of Defense (USNORTHCOM, 2011). While this is true of any combatant command, such as USNORTHCOM, it cannot be ignored that the preponderance of military forces capable and ready to respond to domestic operations is the NG. The NG does not report to USNORTHCOM, thus, creating a gap between the current centralized command responsible for U.S. domestic operations and the forces most capable of executing the domestic mission. It is problematic that USNORTHCOM is currently embedded with FEMA, and not the NG.

Stevenson (2008) is an advocate of placing NG forces within this regional role and having NORTHCOM and other DoD Title 10 assets be the force provider for multi-regional events.

This local and regional response makes regional coordination a logical focal point for NG planning and operational coordination. Events extending beyond regional support (multi-regional) will require additional DoD assets and coordination. NORTHCOM has an existing program to facilitate coordination with the states. The State Engagement Program reaches out to establish relationships with the state emergency management agencies to prepare to provide DSCA support—if required. In many cases, this is redundant to the existing NG DSCA effort and structure within the state. A considered approach, therefore, is to leverage NORTHCOM to provide the national level of DSCA support, while focusing NG assets at the regional level. (Stevenson, 2008, p. 72)

B. INTEGRATING THE NG WITH FEMA

Utilizing NG forces within the FEMA regions was one of the recommendations provided by the Homeland Security Policy Institute. The study recommended that representatives from the NGB and each state NG command be assigned to their

respective FEMA regional headquarters to help coordinate the appropriate integration of NG Forces (Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2006, p. 20). This recommendation echoes the recommendation from Stevenson and addresses the current gap at the regional level with regard to NG forces. Hall (2009) made a similar recommendation when he stated that the NGB and each of the states should invest operationally at the regional level, by providing staff officers to support the DCO of each FEMA region to assist in planning and coordination (Hall, 2009, p. 19). In addition to Hall's sentiments regarding investing at the regional level, the NG should also fill the DCO position (currently an active duty Title 10 position), and not just provide officers to support this position. It will be more effective for the entire DCO staff, to include the DCO, to be from the NG because of its ability and knowledge of the NG assets within the states of their respective region.

The 2009 North Dakota floods highlighted the need for a formal relationship between the NG and FEMA. A finding in the official After Actions Review for the floods written by the North Dakota Adjutant General, Major General David Sprynczynatyk, stated that an uncoordinated effort existed between the NG and FEMA regarding the number of aircraft to be utilized in flood response. The finding stated,

FEMA determined that a significant number of aircraft (in addition to the 10 x NDNG aircraft) would be required for Search and Rescue (SAR) and medium lift missions to support a potential evacuation of the City of Fargo. The NDNG was not consulted in this analysis. At the height of the operation, there were 36 out-of-state rotary wing aircraft (in addition to the 10 x NDNG aircraft) on the ground in North Dakota. Initially, there was lack of coordination between the Air Ops Branch (a component of ND-DES under the Incident Command System) and the JFHQ-JOC. (Sprynczynatyk, 2009, p. 6)

The key issue is the lack of coordination between NG forces and FEMA. It could be argued that having additional aircraft is not a big issue; however, the additional responsibility of command and control and logistical support fell on the North Dakota NG, which was never consulted about the additional aircraft. The recommendation from the North Dakota NG review stated, "The FEMA mission assignment process needs to include the opportunity for NG input into their analysis particularly when considering

additional military assets. This is especially important when in-bound aircraft are to fall within the Joint Force Headquarters' (JFHQ) Joint Aviation Task Force (JATF) control with responsibilities for not only command and control (C2) but bed down requirements, etc” (Sprynczynatyk, 2009, p. 6).

One potential option is for the NG to invest in additional resources within each of the 10 FEMA regional headquarters. This influx from the NG could either replace or augment the existing DoD assets currently working within the FEMA regional structure. With the placement of one permanent officer within each headquarters comprised of a staff representing each state within that FEMA region, the NG would be able to coordinate and respond to regional events more effectively. This increase in manning would equate to 10 additional senior officers, as well as 54 additional members representing each state and territory within their respective FEMA region. For example, in FEMA region II (Figure 11), the NG would have a senior officer for the entire region, as well as a staff consisting of officers from New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.



Figure 11. Map of Ten FEMA Regions (From: Department of Interior, 2011)

This solution is very similar to what Stevenson proposed where he stated that each state should be represented within the staff, but that the NGB should be charged with providing the leadership. His point was to insure that the leadership was not affiliated directly with the states. “The team will conduct planning with a focus on integration of state plans and capabilities. This would extend across a regional support framework” (Stevenson, 2008, p. 75). This structure is similar to how the NGB works. Ultimately, the leadership within the NGB comes from personnel from the 54 states and territories; however, when representing and working for the NGB, they are placed in Title 10 federal status with no state affiliation; thus, not utilizing a state position. Each state representative will remain on Title 32 orders and represent the respective state within the

FEMA office of the DCO. The DCO will be a NG officer selected by the NGB and be placed on a Title 10 tour, which would allow the officer to work in a NGB position and not require a manpower position from the state.

C. ENHANCING THE EMAC

The benefit of establishing a formal relationship between FEMA and the NG at the regional level will not only address the lack of military assets available regionally but will aid the NG process in responding across state lines. The current EMAC system is adequate at best. A NG staff at each FEMA regional headquarters will be able to better coordinate and cross-flow required NG assets where needed; something that the individual 54 state and territories have been unable to do effectively. Assisting in the coordination at the NGB level has also proven to be a slow process due to the structure of 54 separate states and territories.

The personnel placed in these regional offices will have the ability to coordinate assets quickly when required within their region. If a flood occurs in New Jersey, the senior NG member at FEMA region II will have the knowledge of what the state of New York has for NG assets. The solution is as simple as creating an inter-state mutual aid agreement, similar to the existing EMAC. Having a dedicated regional office will eliminate many of the current problems with the EMAC system. The regional office will be astutely aware of the resources and assets within each state in the region, which alone would eliminate many of the reported delays with the current EMAC system because states did not know what was available to ask for, or did not know what assets they had available to assist.

The lack of a regional structure has been noted in several after action reviews regarding Hurricane Katrina. One recommendation in an after action report from Louisiana suggested the creation of regional ‘hurricane managers’ to coordinate operations (Waugh, 2007, p. 111). “The White House report on Katrina also pointed out the need for regional coordination, including the development of homeland security regions” (Waugh, 2007, p. 111). This shift towards regional thinking has direct implications for the NG.

Establishing a regionalized approach will also have the effect of cross leveling the capabilities of NG units. A rare asset, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), only found in a few states would not be constrained by only their states' boundary. The other states within that FEMA region would have more access to and be more likely to utilize these assets when needed. Having one staff within each of the 10 FEMA regions focused on their regional assets and capabilities within their region is far more effective than one staff attempting to do the same for 54 separate states and territories.

Essentially, each region's staff would have a firm grasp of all NG assets within that region, noting the specialty units, such as UAVs, intelligence, and search and rescue. The command and control for these units would not change; it would remain in a state status under the command of their governor. Through the knowledge of the regional staff, as well as an increased effort for the states to bolster their existing mutual aid agreements, NG forces would be readily available to aid anywhere within that region, not just within their state.

Through the current EMAC process, states individually send NG assets to the requesting state. Unfortunately, this process does not have a NG regional staff to direct these assets where they are needed and often assets are given to a state solely because it requested the assets first, and not necessarily, because it needed them the most. "The Louisiana governor's office was slow to formulate and issue its requests. The disconnects between the governor's office and local emergency management and emergency response agencies made it difficult to identify needs and to determine what kinds of EMAC resources to request. Louisiana officials were much less familiar with the system than their counterparts in other affected states" (Waugh, 2007, p. 108). A regional staff would aid greatly in addressing these issues and ensuring that assets would be allocated appropriately.

The disconnects that plagued the EMAC process during Hurricane Katrina have not gone away. Two line items in a 2008 report highlighted the need for NGB to "enhance EMAC visibility amongst the States and enhance the effectiveness and

efficiency of the DOD process for responding to FEMA” (National Guard Bureau J7, 2008, p. 10). Essentially, the states more savvy in the EMAC process received the assets as opposed to the state that truly needed them.

The states within FEMA Region Six have recently established an mutual agreement to aid one another in an emergency. This new agreement sets the priorities for these states to request assistance within their own FEMA region prior to requesting nationwide. It takes EMAC to a new level and expedites the process in which the regional headquarters will facilitate the coordination between the five states so they can get the immediate resources they need (Ziebarth, 2009). Taking this extra step in solidifying the agreements within FEMA Region 6 will only increase the efficiency and speed in which assets in need will be deployed. Instead of relying on the vast EMAC network, Region 6 has established a mutual aid agreement that essentially states it will aid regionally before going nationwide, which follows the principal of span of control and reaffirms the shift towards regionalization. Adding a small regional staff to facilitate the coordination of all NG assets within the region would establish the NG as a significant regional force multiplier. The recently established HRF is an example of this regional capability and is discussed in the next chapter.

Many other states have recognized the need to plan for emergencies and understand potential shortfalls within their states. Louisiana learned from its experiences during Hurricane Katrina. It has been working with neighboring states to identify resources that can fill gaps identified through in-state planning efforts. They have developed agreements to request security personnel from Arkansas and commodity distribution support from Oklahoma (Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 31). While these states are actively pursuing the enhancement of regional relationships without a dedicated NG regional staff, it is important to understand the utility and need of a regionalized NG staff to address these issues better.

Establishing a structure by creating permanent positions for the NG at the FEMA region headquarters rather than the current ad hoc or “surge” arrangements will encourage the use of interstate assistance during routine incidents that do not rise to the level of catastrophic incidents, which will help to embed the concept of regional and

multi-jurisdictional response into day-to-day planning, coordination and collaboration, and therefore, make regional and multi-jurisdictional response during catastrophic incidents much less of a foreign concept. “Pre-incident interaction will go a long way towards alleviating the problem of first exchanging business cards during a disaster or major incident/crisis” (Hall, 2009, p. 22).

D. THE WAY AHEAD

In principal, the establishment of a military staff in conjunction with the 10 FEMA regions has already occurred; unfortunately, they are represented by the wrong military organization. Currently, USNORTHCOM is filling staff positions within each of the FEMA regions with a NG liaison. These positions should be vacated for the NG to establish the staff presence within FEMA and allow for a USNORTHCOM liaison officer.

As discussed earlier, the NG is the appropriate military organization to have a staff at each regional headquarters. The NG has the ability to bring several thousand Soldiers and Airmen to an incident, and is able to do so without requiring Presidential authorization or having to bypass statutes, such as the Posse Comitatus Act. Simply put, the NG has the forces and the legal backing to conduct domestic operations.

The structure USNORTHCOM is currently using within the FEMA regional headquarters would work as a suitable model for the NG. Essentially, each region would have a representative from each state within that region to ensure that each state is represented and comprises the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO). The senior member of this staff would fill the role of the DCO. A semantic name change would be appropriate. Thus, instead of DCO, the NG Coordinating Officer (NGCO) would be more fitting with a staff that mirrors the current defense-coordinating element. Again, it would be appropriate to replace defense with NG. A review of the current DCO responsibilities that the NGCO would take as listed on the FEMA website follow.

- Subject matter expert for all state and federal emergency response plans
- Build synergy and habitual relationships with:
 - FEMA staff
 - State emergency responders
 - State Adjutant General and Joint Force Headquarters-State staff
- Key player in all local, state, federal, and DoD homeland defense and civil support exercises
- Oversight with all military installations regarding Base Support Installation (BSI) operations
- National Special Security Event (NSSE) planning and support
- Be prepared to conduct operations in another region

The NGB should fund and create this position to prevent any perceived bias by having an officer from one of the states performing as the NGCO. The NGCO, similar to the staff officers that work at NGB, will be on Title 32 status.

The EPLOs will represent each state within the region and are exactly as their name suggests, liaison officers. Similar to the model USNORTHCOM currently uses, these members do not need to be assigned permanently to the FEMA regional headquarters. The EPLOs should work in the NG headquarters of their state and be the main point of contact between the NGCO and their state. During an incident, especially involving their state, they should deploy to their regional headquarters to better fulfill their liaison duties. The EPLOs should be NG members that work for their state fulltime. As a result, they will remain on the payroll of their individual state and operate in a Title 32 status. The EPLO roles and responsibilities would mirror the current tasks as listed by the FEMA website.

- DoD liaison with states and federal agencies for DSCA
- Visibility with the NG
- Observe and participate in training exercises
- Non-affected EPLOs augment the Defense Coordinating Unit (DCU)
- Maintain situational awareness within the state
- Augment the DCU on activation
- Subject matter experts for the region and on the DoD services

- Highly-trained in Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) and Mission Assignment (MA) development
- Staff reserve element for the steady-state DCE

The staff should consist of enough manning to support continuous operations during an incident. The current roles and responsibilities as described by the FEMA website are the following.

- Deploy consistent with current response plans
- Represent the DoD in the disaster area
- Provide liaison to state, local, and other federal agencies
- Validate MAs from the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)
- Determine the best military resource for the mission
- Command and control of deployed DoD forces

In addition to the NGCO, the full-time staff should consist of an assistant NGCO, and two additional staff officers. In total, these four officers will be the backbone for all NG operations and exercises within the region. They will have direct contact with each of the state EPLOs. In addition to conducting their assigned duties as described by the FEMA website, the two additional staff officers will focus on training and preparedness. The training officer will be charged with developing appropriate regional training exercises that consist of all levels of support ranging from local to inter-state. The preparedness officer will develop mutual aid agreements and further facilitate the use of NG forces throughout the region.

This structure is very similar to the construct in which USNORTHCOM has established its DCO and staff within each FEMA region (Figure 12). Currently, the staff consists of a full-time DCO, a part-time Deputy and two full-time operations officers. The civilian Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) planner and full-time signal non-commissioned officer (NCO) are in addition to the proposed staff for the NG.




Figure 12. Defense Coordinating Officer and Staff Organization (From: Young, n.d.)

The net “price” for the NG to take on the role of regionalizing within the 10 FEMA regions is essentially 10 senior officers to fill the NGCO and 30 officers to round out the staff. Forty officers, four in each region, is certainly a robust requirement to fill; however, given the current manning of the NG, is feasible. The benefit of establishing these positions will certainly more than account for the cost. For the DoD, the net change would be zero since USNORTHCOM is currently fulfilling the roles within these areas.

This concept is supported by a recent Hurricane Season After Action Review that stated that a direct link between the NG and FEMA is needed. The observation stated to “include the NG as a sourcing option for FEMA Mission Assignments to the Department of Defense” (National Guard Bureau J7, 2008, p. 13). The review went on to elaborate how FEMA requests for DoD support have increased since Hurricane Katrina and that some of these requests could be sourced more efficiently and cost effectively by the NG under state control. Currently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, FEMA and the NG are sourcing this potential solution (National Guard Bureau J7, 2008, p. 13).

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VI. ANALYSIS OF CRITERIA AND CONCLUSION

A. ANALYZING THE CRITERIA

1. Command and Control

Establishing a regional focus utilizing the 10 FEMA regions as the model would enable the NG to have better command and control during a domestic operation. Currently, with 54 separate states and territories each conducting their own individual operations increases the difficulties of establishing a fluid command and control model, which is further complicated when the operation extends beyond the border of one state, as recent history has continually shown. Establishing a regional construct reduces the command and control responsibility from 54 down to at most eight.

2. Interagency Collaboration

Recent natural disasters that have involved both the NG and FEMA all seem to have one common theme, better collaboration between the NG and FEMA needs to occur. Both organizations are critical when responding to a domestic operation; however, continual reports state that both organizations have problems communicating and collaborating when it is most needed.

Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina to the recent flooding in North Dakota in 2011 have identified the trend that the NG and FEMA need to continue to improve on collaborating to complete the mission successfully. This trend seems to stem from the fact that neither organization is effectively imbedded in the other. This lack of cohesion prevents one from knowing what the other is doing.

The benefit of placing a staff of NG personnel within each FEMA regions' headquarters is the fact that it provides a starting point for this coordination and collaboration to begin. Within the region's headquarters, the NG will have a representative from each state within the region, which could establish the link for better collaboration both that the regional headquarters and in the field within the disaster area.

3. Using Canada's Model

CF provide a good example of how the U.S. NG could be better utilized through a regional model. Canada faces many of the same threats and its government and culture closely resemble that of the United States. The ability for CF to respond quickly and efficiently to domestic operations is certainly a model to explore with the NG in the United States.

One of the key components that allow CF to conduct domestic operations successfully is the use of their regional headquarters. Utilizing the existing FEMA regional headquarters similar to the Canadian regional headquarters, the U.S. NG would be able to create a model similar in structure to the role of CF within domestic operations.

4. The Homeland Response Force

The creation of the HRF is a step toward regionalization for the NG. Representing less than 2% of the NG force, the HRF's will be regionally focused within each of the FEMA regions and concentrate mainly on CBRNE response. This new program will not be operational until 2014 so the full understanding of how this creation will affect the relationship and collaboration between FEMA and the NG is still not understood. As this program develops, certainly this area will require additional research to understand better if this small percentage of regionalizing the NG is a good precursor to regionalizing the rest of the force.

B. CONCLUSION

Over the past 10 years, the NG has increasingly become more involved in domestic operations and a trend that will likely continue to grow, as domestic threats continue to increase and the devastation from natural disasters continues to have widespread effects. Although the NG is well suited and a logical choice for domestic operations, one of the issues with this mission set is the current organization and structure

of the NG. The NG was historically set up as a militia for each individual state and later became a reserve of the U.S. Armed Forces. As a result, the NG is not necessarily organized in a way to respond to multi-state domestic incidents.

Over the last decade, the NG has addressed the increase in domestic operations by continually incorporating past lessons learned and adapting the force to respond better. The NG recognizes that it must continue to evolve to remain relevant. The development of the essential 10 capabilities for use in domestic operations, JET teams, the continual improvement of the EMAC process, and the ongoing development of the HRF are all examples of the NG evolving to increase relevance within domestic operations.

The primary question explored by this thesis is what organizational changes can be made within the NG to effect domestic operations better?

The best answer to this question is to increase the collaboration between the NG and FEMA by increasing the NG staff within each FEMA regional headquarters. Currently, the relationship between the NG and FEMA is through a liaison officer. While USNORTHCOM is responsible to FEMA as the primary military link for domestic operations, this role should be reversed to allow the NG to have the primary staffing function within FEMA for military domestic operations and USNORTHCOM to act as liaison. This change would establish a direct link between FEMA and the NG and improve domestic response in the areas of command and control, interagency collaboration, and types of specialized forces used in a domestic operation.

The staffing of NG personnel at each of the FEMA regional headquarters will have a number of positive effects. First, it reduces the span of control currently managed by the NGB from 54 down to 10 regions. It will also better facilitate the use of assets across the region by establishing a regional focus rather than a state-centric focus with NG forces. Planning will be enhanced because the NG, FEMA, and the states within their respective regions will already have an established structure within each FEMA regional headquarters.

The 2010 QDR supports this recommendation, which states that the DoD will undergo a reorganization of forces focusing on the regionalization NG CBRNE units. The QDR states that regionalizing will enhance their lifesaving capabilities, maximize their flexibility, and reduce their response times. The QDR is referencing the HRF, which is scheduled to be complete in 2014.

The NG will continue to play a large role within domestic operations. To continue to address these mission sets, the NG will need to evolve continually. One key piece of this evolution is to recognize where change is needed. Establishing a solid collaborative link between the NG and FEMA within each regional headquarters will provide a more effective and efficient responding force in domestic operations.

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